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Local agencies drive criminal justice policy, but states pick up the 
tab for policy choices that result in state imprisonment. This distorts 
local policies and may actually contribute to increased state prison 
populations, since prison is effectively “free” to the local 
decisionmakers who send inmates there. This Article looks directly at the 
source of the “correctional free lunch” problem and proposes to end 
state funding for prisons. States would, instead, reallocate money spent 
on prisons to localities to use as they see fit—on enforcement, treatment, 
or even per-capita prison usage. This would allow localities to retain 





The size and scope of the mass incarceration problem in the United 
States should, by now, be news to no one. State prisons incarcerate 
approximately 1.4 million people[FN1] at an annual cost of 
approximately forty billion dollars.[FN2] Rates of population increase 
have slowed in recent years,[FN3] but the United States is still 
incarcerating almost twice *1061 the number of people as it was twenty 
years ago,[FN4] and nearly eight times the number forty years 
ago.[FN5] Given the size and expense, states continue to grapple with 
ways to control their prison populations. 
One problem state officials have, though, is that they don't decide 
who goes to prison: local officials do, by their decisions about 
investigation, prosecution, and, to a more limited extent, sentencing. 
Local officials can choose both whether to investigate and what to 
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investigate, whether to prosecute someone and what to prosecute them 
for.[FN6] State officials can neither compel localities to enforce a 
particular law in a particular instance, nor can they prohibit them from 
doing so. There is ample slippage between crime and a locality's 
response to it, and these local variations have profound effects on the 
size of prison populations. In a prior article, I found that prison usage in 
California varied dramatically from county to county over a ten-year 
period, but that these variations were not explained by variations in 
reported rates of violent crime.[FN7] The problem is exacerbated by the 
political economy of criminal justice, as a second article explains.[FN8] 
Criminal justice is local, and those who implement it are elected locally. 
At the same time, penal codes are written expansively by state legislators 
who seek symbolic accomplishments to demonstrate their concerns with 
crime and insecurity.[FN9] Given the expansive scope of the statutory 
regime and the lack of control over those who implement it, we should 
thus expect policies to diverge: local officials can implement *1062 
policies reflecting the policy preferences of the local population, 
knowing that the full measure of social costs will be borne elsewhere, by 
the state as a whole. As long as local decisionmakers please their 
constituents, it doesn't matter how much they displease other citizens of 
the state. 
With these concerns in mind, one might think that state officials 
would somehow seek to ration access to prisons, either by only accepting 
a certain number of prisoners or by retaining some right of refusal over 
which type of offenders localities send to prison. But not only do state 
governments generally not ration access to prison, they actually pay for 
it. Prison is, effectively, free to localities, a phenomenon that Franklin 
Zimring and Gordon Hawkins termed “the correctional free 
lunch.”[FN10] This largesse seems stranger still when one considers that 
local, cheaper alternatives to prison, such as jail, treatment, and 
probation, are not typically subsidized by state governments. State 
governments thus make prison, the most expensive form of criminal 
sanction,[FN11] free to localities, while making localities bear the cost 
of cheaper alternatives to it. Prison subsidies make prison more abundant 
to local decisionmakers, giving them greater incentives to use it. Is it any 
wonder that localities' use of prison costs state governments billions in 
the aggregate? 
This Article explores what might happen if state governments 
refused to pay for the unconditional usage of their prisons, and imagines 
what might replace the prison subsidy. Just as the end of the Cold War 
prompted calls for a “peace dividend,” reallocating money spent on the 
military, one might consider the end of state prison subsidies an 
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opportunity for a “prison dividend,” reallocating the money spent on 
prisons towards other criminal justice or social development policies. 
Two particular fiscal policies are proposed as a means of exploring 
alternatives to state prison funding, both of which would internalize the 
costs of local criminal justice policies. 
The first proposal, violent crime block grants, would simply 
distribute the prison subsidy to counties[FN12] without changing other 
facts about criminal justice administration. Rather than spending money 
to house a *1063 county's prisoners, a state government would 
distribute this pool of money to its counties on the basis of per capita 
reported violent crime. Counties could use this money to treat crime 
however they wished, including sending offenders to state prisons. The 
difference would be that counties would have to pay for any prison 
beds they wanted to use, and the costs of given decisions would be 
easier to track. 
The second proposal, local unification, would be funded the same 
way—by reallocation of the prison subsidy—but it would eliminate 
state administration. State agencies would be split into smaller, unified 
criminal justice units, wherein all of the features of criminal justice, 
from policing to imprisonment to post-release supervision, would be 
under the administration of a single agency with an overarching budget. 
This would allow localities to retain their local decision-making 
autonomy, but it would also encourage the various parts of the criminal 
justice system to consider how the actions of one part affect resources 
available to other parts. 
My hypothesis is that localities that bore the cost of imprisonment 
would be less likely to use it, but this is not a necessary 
outcome.[FN13] Neither proposal would commandeer localities in any 
way. Localities could still imprison at relatively high rates[FN14] if 
they were willing to pay for it, but the proposals would make the 
implications of local choices easier to see and would ensure that state 
governments would no longer bear unlimited financial responsibility 
for local decisions. If localities used prison in spite of the cost, this 
would much more likely be a reflection of local values than subsidized 
usage. Forcing localities to pay for their decisions and live with the 
consequences would take local autonomy seriously. 
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I demonstrates why case-by-
case approaches to regulating prison usage are doomed to fail: there is 
no way to differentiate between “real” and “discretionary” causes in 
observed criminal justice outcomes. Part II lays out two *1064 
systematic fiscal mechanisms for regulating a decentralized system: 
funding on the basis of violent crime and local unified criminal justice. 
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Part III discusses possible criticisms of decentralized policies, including 
distributional concerns and questions about scale and complexity. 
 
I. The Real Offense Problem—Or, Why Case-Level Policies are 
Bound to Fail 
 
One might hypothesize that prisons are overcrowded because 
localities err on the side of overzealous prosecution. We might suspect 
that certain localities over-investigate and over-charge crimes that 
shouldn't really warrant that attention, even though there is nothing 
“technically” improper about investigating them and charging people 
with them. 
Many authors have wrestled with the problem of discretion in 
criminal justice and proposed guiding it or regulating it in order to avoid 
overuse.[FN15] Discretion itself is actually not the problem, of course: 
most people would agree that there are close cases that involve judgment 
calls, and that there is no satisfactory way of creating binding ex ante 
rules governing every situation. Concerns about discretion might more 
accurately be described as concerns about bias masquerading as 
discretion.[FN16] 
The problem with focusing on individual cases is that that there is 
*1065 no such thing as a “normal” charge or “normal” enforcement in a 
given case to which we could compare “over-charging” and “over-
enforcement.”[FN17] One could look at the median sentence for a given 
crime, or the median charge-to-arrest ratio, and conclude that something 
is going on with a given local agency, but it would be impossible to prove 
which cases were over-charged and/or over-sentenced. Perhaps a crime 
was charged because a prosecutor thought it was particularly egregious, 
or perhaps it was done simply to rid the county of the costs of 
rehabilitation. The observed result—the charge and sentence—will not, 
on its face, tell us whether the exercise of discretion was reasonable or 
not. In short, we might have our suspicions, and they might not be 
unfounded, but we would be unable to find evidence that would prove 
our suspicions correct. 
This Part discusses why distinguishing between “normal” and 
“unreasonable” law enforcement and prosecution in individual cases is 
impossible. There is no way of “neutrally” enforcing a law because it is 
impossible to distinguish—ex ante or ex post—between an ordinary 
application of the law and an extraordinary one.[FN18] I call this 
problem the “real offense” problem. Even if we could solve the real 
offense problem, however, and could agree on how to charge a given set 
of facts, the issue of what “real sentence” to impose on such a charge 
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would present the same difficulties. Given the real offense and real 
sentence problems, proposals that seek to achieve an optimal level of 
imprisonment through incentives in individual cases (e.g., targeting 
police or District Attorneys and their charging/sentencing/pleading) are, 
however well-intentioned, ultimately unworkable. We have no way to 
distinguish between the observed outcome (what happened) from the 
baseline (what should have happened) because we cannot define what 
the baseline offense and its corresponding baseline sentence *1066 looks 
like in the “real world.” This fundamental reality is why policies should 
focus on systems, not cases, and on crimes, not dispositions.[FN19] 
* * * 
There is no one way to cut the facts of a given offense so that we 
know what the “real” offense is; this was known even to prison reformers 
of the early nineteenth century.[FN20] There are several reasons, some 
of them doctrinal, some of them relating to evidence. Five will be 
discussed here. 
First, as a matter of doctrine, Blockburger v. United States long ago 
established the difference between events and offenses.[FN21] 
Defendant Blockburger sold morphine to a single purchaser, was 
charged with five violations of the Harrison Narcotic Act, and convicted 
on three counts.[FN22] Two of the three convictions arose from the same 
sale: a charge of selling the drug “not in or from the original stamped 
package,” and selling it “not in pursuance of a written order of the 
purchaser ….”[FN23] Blockburger argued that these charges constituted 
only a single offense, for which he could be punished only once.[FN24] 
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that “[a] single act may be an 
offense against two statutes; and if each statute requires proof of an 
additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under 
either statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution and 
punishment under the other.”[FN25] Blockburger forecloses arguments 
about the real offense. There is no “right” charge among a prosecutor's 
possible charges, and there is no way to say what the “core” offense 
*1067 of a given event is.[FN26] Offenses are creatures of statute, not 
representations of Platonic forms. 
A second, related point is that expansive penal codes have made 
charging the centerpiece of criminal justice policy. There are many ways 
in which a prosecutor can charge a given set of facts. William Stuntz, in 
his seminal article “The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law,” 
observed that modern codes make it easy to charge a given real event 
with multiple statutory violations, making prosecutors “the criminal 
justice system's real lawmakers.”[FN27] The central determination of 
outcomes, including prison usage, is not criminal activity, but charging. 
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Professor John Pfaff has recently examined how charging affects 
imprisonment, concluding that “at least since 1994, prison growth has 
been driven primarily by prosecutors increasing the rate at which they 
file charges against arrestees.”[FN28] Charging practices vary, of 
course, because even within penal codes prosecutors can choose which 
of the many applicable statutes to use.[FN29] Stuntz argued that 
discretion could, in the end, only be limited by reducing the breadth and 
depth of a state's penal code. As long as laws are on the books, no 
doctrinal barriers will prohibit a locality from enforcing them. Expansive 
penal codes have expanded local discretion and, with it, local 
policymaking. 
Third, prosecutors might charge—or accept pleas—for strategic 
reasons having nothing to do with the underlying crimes themselves. 
Prosecutors might want to charge certain crimes only to induce 
defendants to make a given deal, and they might land on certain crimes 
as compromises between a plea offer and counter-offer. A recent 
empirical study by Professor Kyle Graham analyzed five years of data 
from the federal system and found that some crimes were often charged 
but seldom pleaded to, while other crimes were seldom charged but often 
pleaded to, a valuable insight into how ultimate *1068 charges might 
perhaps be dominated by bargaining in the marketplace.[FN30] 
A fourth, related, explanation might have to do with the information 
a defendant has to offer the prosecution. We can easily imagine a case 
involving two defendants, equally complicit, in which one is offered a 
better deal because he or she has more valuable information to offer law 
enforcement. If someone is just along for the ride while narcotics are 
being transported, she and the driver will still be charged based on the 
weight of the narcotics. But if she knows less about the operation—if she 
cannot say who supplied the drugs or who was going to buy them—she 
has less to offer and will not be eligible to trade that information for a 
discount on her sentence. The person with more knowledge of or 
participation in the offense—arguably the more deserving of 
punishment—will be able to offer more information in exchange for a 
reduced sentence and will be punished less severely.[FN31] 
Fifth, cases might have different outcomes based on the strength of 
or admissibility of evidence, factors that have nothing to do with guilt. 
A witness with a record will be subject to impeachment during cross-
examination and can weaken or strengthen the case, depending on 
whether she is testifying for the prosecution or the defense. There might 
be problems with a crime lab, or with the chain of custody of evidence. 
There might be evidence that needs to be suppressed due to Fourth 
Amendment violations[FN32] or problems in taking confessions.[FN33] 
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Prosecutorial witnesses might not cooperate, or defense witnesses might 
not show up. These evidentiary concerns have nothing to do *1069 with 
“the facts” and everything to do with “the case.” The two are distinct; 
that is the essence of the real offense problem. 
This list of factors does not include other strategic reasons for 
different charges or arrests (e.g., charging a defendant with conspiracy 
in order to get hearsay evidence before the jury). It also does not account 
for the possibility that the quality of lawyers in a particular case or in a 
particular part of the bar (defense or prosecution) might result in different 
outcomes. For those cases that go to trial, of course, there is no way to 
control for juries and judges that are harsher or easier than another. Jury 
decisions are black boxes—we don't typically know what goes on 
there—and appeals courts do not generally revisit their findings of 
fact.[FN34] Similarly, judges' rulings from the bench can affect the 
outcome (e.g., suppression motions) even where there is not a bench trial. 
The point here is not merely that we do not know what the real 
offense is in the current system, but that we cannot know it.[FN35] 
Whether a given set of facts matches a given statute is, at some level, 
irreducibly a question of judgment. Any data would merely be a product 
of that judgment, using judgment (“this should be first-degree murder”) 
to measure judgment (“but it only got manslaughter”). For example, in 
California, violations of some statutes known as “wobblers” can be 
charged as either felonies or misdemeanors.[FN36] A recent study 
examined charging practices of a statute criminalizing, inter alia, 
methamphetamine possession, and found that “[t]he variation in 
charging this crime as a misdemeanor ranges from 0% to 100% across 
counties.”[FN37] But one cannot definitively state that counties which 
more often charge wobblers as felonies always do so for policy reasons: 
*1070 some cases might be felonies because they were, in fact, the kinds 
of offenses “we” think should be charged as felonies, even though others 
might be charged as felonies merely because a District Attorney wanted 
them to be considered as such. And even if a case were charged to reflect 
the District Attorney's preferences, one would have to be able to discern 
that the district attorney was either insincere or wrong in this assessment 
in order to isolate examples of over- or under-charging. 
Assuming we could solve the problem in theory, no statistics are kept 
on non-statutory factors (e.g., an index of “seriousness” distinguishing a 
kid playing with matches from arson), so even if we were to isolate which 
factors were theoretically relevant, we would have no way of knowing 
which ones were operative in a particular case. We do not have careful 
records on plea bargain factors, nor do we generally learn potentially 
dispositive investigative factors from police reports—at least not in a 
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form that would readily lend itself to analysis. Even in the case of drug 
possession offenses, for example, where the quantity of drug is the 
driving factor behind charges, such data is hard to obtain.[FN38] Plea 
bargains are largely unregulated, and they comprise the overwhelming 
majority of dispositions. To the extent we do have data, it is noisy and 
imprecise. 
* * * 
Even if we could figure out the real offense, we would need to match 
it to a real sentence, and there is no inexorable sentence for a given crime, 
with given evidence, and a given statute. We do not agree on the goals 
of criminal justice ex ante. (Is justice local? Is it victim-driven? Is the 
existence of a statute and a set of enhancements an accurate measure of 
a state's view of just punishment?). Even if we did, it seems difficult to 
imagine that we could agree on how these goals should be applied in a 
particular case. The problems generated by discretion are further 
exacerbated by the fact that penal codes can allow for a wide range of 
criminal penalties to attach to a given set of facts, even within a given 
crime. We have a balance enforced by systemic financial and personnel 
constraints. The reality is that a district attorney can—but does not have 
to—charge a number of crimes and that a public defender can—but does 
not have to—go to trial, and that they will bargain over both charges and 
recommended sentences. 
If one cannot know how different offenses are “really” different from 
each other, it is impossible to set out benchmarks of what “should have” 
happened in a particular case. One cannot say that a county *1071 should 
have had a certain level of prison usage based on a set of events and then 
use what “should have” happened in the aggregate to punish or reward 
the district attorney.[FN39] Individual cases cannot be systematically 
separated into “reasonable” and “unreasonable” categories, which is 
what would be required to determine exactly when a prosecutor 
overstepped the bounds of reasonable discretion.[FN40] 
All of this means that a focus on individual cases as a means of 
harmonizing law enforcement within a state misses the mark entirely. 
Systemic problems cannot be solved by individually-targeted solutions. 
If the problem is at a systemic level—and, more importantly, if the 
diagnosis can only take place at a systemic level—it makes much more 
sense to adopt wider, more loosely-fitting solutions (such as broad fiscal 
constraints) rather than finely-drawn ones that operate on individual 
actors in individual cases. The system deals with individual cases in 
shades of gray, and turning a gray case black or white only makes it 
easier to sort, not, in some ultimate sense, “truer.” Putting an 
Criminal Law Bulletin 12/15/2014 1:39 PM 
 
 
indeterminate object in a determinate box is neither more precise nor 
more accurate—it is less of both. 
 
II. Fiscal Limits on Local Discretion 
 
Even though counties use state prison resources at different 
rates,[FN41] they do not typically pay the state based on this usage. State 
prisons are paid for out of general revenues: counties are not charged for 
heavy usage, nor are they reimbursed for light usage. Counties that 
choose to use state prison to address crime are, in essence, subsidized by 
counties that choose local programs such as probation and treatment 
instead, since the state typically pays for prison and the county pays for 
local dispositions. In another article, I argue that unless the case can be 
made for the superiority of prison over other *1072 dispositions, the state 
should not subsidize prisons without subsidizing other responses to 
crime.[FN42] 
The fiscal and administrative dimensions of the state prison subsidy 
might be analyzed on three dimensions: who pays, who administers, and 
how centralized the system is. Each could be analyzed independently of 
the others. For example, we might imagine state governments paying 
localities to administer a decentralized system. We might equally 
imagine localities paying the state government to access a centralized 
system. We might also imagine the state paying for a centralized system 
that it administers. 
This Part considers two thought experiments that would decentralize 
criminal justice and move fiscal responsibility down to the level where 
decisions are currently being made, then compares both experiments 
with a completely centralized model. Both of these thought experiments 
would reallocate the money state governments currently spends on 
prisons. This money would continue to fund county policies; the 
difference is that this aid would not be made solely in the form of state 
prison usage, nor would it be made on the basis of state prison usage. 
Instead, it would be based on measures of criminal justice need.[FN43] 
The first proposal, violent crime block grants, would address only 
the “who pays” dimension. Localities would receive funds based on 
reported rates of violent crime and would be free to spend these monies 
on prison, diversion, jail, or anything else. State officials would continue 
to administer prisons but would charge counties for every prisoner they 
sent. Any expenses not covered by the violent crime subsidy—including 
extra imprisonment—would be paid for out of local revenues. 
The second proposal, local unification, would again involve the 
reallocation of prison subsidies into criminal justice block grants, but 
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state agencies would no longer administer prisons. Instead, all criminal 
justice functions would be shifted to local criminal justice systems that 
combined both corrections and law enforcement into a single agency. 
This would help localities maintain equilibrium between the law-
enforcement inputs of the system and the carceral outputs of the system. 
These proposals are, in essence, about changing accounting 
practices. They would not necessarily result in lower prison usage—
various localities might decide that higher spending on prison is, indeed, 
worth it. The proposals' main advantages come from improving *1073 
accountability and transparency. By accountability, I mean that the 
resource consequences of a particular decision would be tied more 
closely to the level of government that made that decision. If a county 
decided to spend more money on incarceration, that county—and not the 
state as a whole—would have less money to spend elsewhere. By 
transparency, I mean that people could more easily track the decisions 
that are being made, who made them, and what the consequences were. 
These policies would make it easier for individual residents to see that 
their counties were, in fact, making policy choices about how to deal 
with crime when, for example, they chose imprisonment over treatment 
(or vice-versa). Residents could compare local dispositions—and 
attendant expenditures—to those in other counties, and see that these 
decisions were made by local officials who affected local budgets. The 
combination of accountability and transparency in decision-making 
would more likely result in policies whose costs reflected the local social 
benefits. 
A. Changing State Allocations—Subsidizing Crime Fighting, Not 
Prison 
The first proposal, violent crime block grants, would fund criminal 
justice on the basis of a single statistic: reported violent crime per 
100,000 residents. A state would pool the money it currently spends on 
criminal justice—including all the money currently spent on prisons—
and redistribute it to its localities in the form of violent-crime-treatment 
block grants.[FN44] Counties would have flexibility about how to spend 
their violent-crime weighted share of resources—on prison, on law 
enforcement, on treatment or even social services. A state could still 
offer to house prisoners but would charge for prison beds on a per capita 
basis. As counties ran out of state money—having spent it on prison or 
other policies—they would need to raise local funds. They would also 
get to keep any money they didn't spend. The thrust of the proposal 
would tie funding to reported crime rates rather than political capital or 
prison usage, directing funding formulas away from criminal justice 
usage and towards criminal justice need. The structure of the funding 
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would remind us that we have criminal justice policies to decrease the 
social harm from crime, not to keep particular institutions fully funded. 
The violent crime block grant proposal has several potential benefits. 
First is its simplicity. Violent crime block grants could be implemented 
without substantial structural changes to state and local governments. 
*1074 Because budgets would be based on a single set of statistics, 
voters could more easily track why budgets fluctuated. I pick violent 
crime specifically because it fits best with justifications for criminal 
sanctions. From a public safety and incapacitation perspective, violent 
criminals are the most dangerous. From a retributive perspective, violent 
crimes are the most deserving of punishment. Of course, states could add 
population, demographics, and other “causes” of crime in the belief that 
such factors contribute to criminal justice needs or to account for 
differences in local resource endowments. Adding other factors besides 
crime might also help with any “winner's curse” problems—the fact that 
localities with successful violent crime reduction programs would, in the 
future, receive less money. The winner's curse could be dealt with in 
other ways as well: the state could smooth year-to-year allocation 
variances by employing a running average of three to five years, lag 
budget reductions for counties which cut violent crime, or allow counties 
to keep a given percentage of costs avoided.[FN45] 
A second benefit is that violent crime block grants could be more 
responsive to crime waves. A state could reserve a certain amount of 
criminal justice funding to deal with sudden increases in crime. If crime 
went up in a given area, a locality would get more money to spend on it, 
but that additional money would not come in the form of a single 
intervention—prison—but with flexible funds that could be used to fight 
crime, not just punish it. 
A third advantage to using violent crime as a funding benchmark is 
that local politicians already have incentives not to inflate crime rate 
numbers. High crime rates are political poison. Incumbents who run on 
a record of having overseen an increase in robberies, rapes, and murders 
are unlikely to win re-election, no matter how many more dollars come 
from the state as a result. Agencies which currently use data-driven 
systems have had problems with the “gaming” of numbers, except the 
incentives there typically result in under-reporting in order to increase 
clearance rates.[FN46] Tying funding to crime would provide a counter-
weight to this tendency: localities would have an incentive to *1075 
admit they have a problem in order to increase the resources needed to 
address it. 
It bears repeating that a locality could always spend more than its 
reallocated prison subsidy by using local funds. The key is that the 
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opportunity costs of these spending decisions would be borne locally. 
The county's decision would involve a choice not to spend local monies 
on something else. Currently, of course, there are opportunity costs to 
prison expenditures, just as there are with every other government 
program, but these tradeoffs are opaque, distributed across a diffuse state 
budget with a wide array of other inputs. If state criminal justice funding 
were, instead, locally accounted for, the resource implications of local 
decisions would be easier to identify. The average person could more 
easily spot the linkage between increasing numbers of local prison 
commitments and, say, a decrease in the frequency of road repairs or a 
shorter public school year, allowing political checks on criminal justice 
to operate more effectively.[FN47] 
B. Breaking Up the State and Unifying the Pieces 
The second proposal, local unification, would get state governments 
out of prison administration entirely. Under local unification, the state 
would once again fund local criminal justice with the money it currently 
spends on prison beds, but it would no longer offer state prison as an 
option. The state would instead be broken into county-sized public safety 
districts. Within each district all aspects of crime control would *1076 
be unified into a single agency with a single budget, including policing, 
jails, prisons, probation, and parole. Some states already unify their 
corrections systems into a single agency;[FN48] the local unification 
proposal expands the idea to include law enforcement.[FN49] Breaking 
up the state and unifying the pieces would account for two externality 
problems: the county/state externality problem and the agency-to-agency 
externality problem. Counties would not be able to pass problems on to 
the state, and agencies would not be able to pass on impacts of their 
policies to other agencies. 
The first part of the proposal, breaking up the state, would begin with 
the fact that counties have different policy preferences and restructure 
criminal justice administration accordingly. A state government might 
lease existing facilities to individual counties or groups of counties, but 
there would be no presumption of state prison administration. Instead, 
counties would provide incarceration, or contract with other entities—
including other counties—to provide incarceration. Thus, not only would 
prison subsidies end, there would be no state prisons to subsidize. 
The second part of the proposal would be to unify the inputs to the 
criminal justice system—law enforcement—with the outputs of the 
system—incarceration, treatment, and community supervision. First, on 
the level of individual treatment, unification could make it easier for 
agencies dealing with a given offender to exchange data and coordinate 
on a common approach.[FN50] Under the present system, the typical 
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offender is passed from police who arrest him, to sheriffs who jail him, 
to prosecutors who charge him and defense attorneys who represent him, 
to courts who sentence him, and then to probation, or to jail, or to prison 
and then parole. Even with one offender in custody for one offense, there 
is very little coordination on programming or information sharing across 
agencies: basic social and medical intake screens are often needlessly 
duplicated; programs targeting the same needs employ different 
methods, approaches, and goals; and continu- *1077 ity of medical and 
psychiatric care is often subject to troublesome gaps.[FN51] 
The second benefit to unifying local criminal justice is that it would 
internalize all the effects of criminal justice interventions. Sound 
corrections can result in lower rates of recidivism, hence smaller drains 
on law enforcement; ineffective corrections can result in greater 
recidivism and increased law enforcement costs.[FN52] On the other 
side of the ledger, good policing, coupled with early, low-level 
intervention, can result in lower usage of prison.[FN53] But the current 
system does not reward such policies: the reduction in resource usage is 
realized in another agency's budget. Under local unification, the agency 
as a whole would save whenever society did. Unifying corrections and 
law enforcement would mean that policies that benefit another part of 
the system would no longer be under-funded relative to their social 
utility. The resource implications of all interventions—whether broken-
windows policing on the front end, releasing prisoners on their own 
recognizance while awaiting trial, or post-release supervision on the 
back end—would be much clearer. Any cost savings would result in 
more resources to the unified agency, just as costly measures would 
result in fewer resources—and therefore some deterrence—to the 
agency.[FN54] Successful programs which now generate savings to 
other agencies would be internalized. 
Prosecutors, for example, would maintain the level of discretion they 
currently have, but they *1078 could also take into account public safety 
as a whole in determining whether a particular case would use 
resources—both in terms of court costs and the costs of the resulting 
sentence—in the most effective way. The crux of the problem, as 
Professor Adam Gershowitz has pointed out, is that prosecutorial 
discretion is currently used without consideration of the resources those 
decisions will consume in other parts of the system.[FN55] Gershowitz 
has proposed that state boards of prisons educate county prosecutors 
about prison overcrowding, with the idea that simply knowing about the 
problem might influence prosecutors' decisions.[FN56] Judges might 
also benefit from more information. In Missouri, for example, judges 
now know the cost of the available sentencing decisions for a given 
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offender, informing the judge's sentencing decision without binding him 
or her to it.[FN57] 
The problem is that neither of these policies imposes any resource 
constraints or rationing. Judges in Missouri can impose expensive 
sentences knowing that the state will be forced to pay for them; 
prosecutors under Gershowitz's policy could send prisoners to crowded 
state prisons notwithstanding the availability of other options. In both 
cases, rational actors could try to “free ride” on the more abstemious 
behavior of their colleagues across the state. 
Unifying local corrections would make ultimate budgetary limits 
easier to discern while maintaining the local freedom to decide how to 
operate within those limits. It would combine internalization of costs and 
benefits with local control and do so in a way that is both far-reaching 
and relatively minimal: minimal because it would not change total 
allocations to criminal justice or dictate particular policies, and far-
reaching because it would make the resource implications of all agency 
decisions more visible and more comprehensive. Accountability—both 
political and economic—would work hand in hand with *1079 
transparency to ensure that given policies were what local citizens 
wanted.[FN58] 
C. Centralization as an Alternative 
The thought experiments proposed above have moved criminal 
justice to the local level, but the article has left unexplored an alternative 
means of dealing with local discretion: eliminating local administration 
entirely. States could create (or expand) statewide police forces, or 
replace local district attorney's offices with branch offices of a statewide 
agency. This would allow statewide policy to be enforced statewide, and 
it might do so in a way that shields actors from local political pressure. 
For example, local police might be limited to reporting crimes and 
gathering information about them, while statewide police would have the 
exclusive ability to charge and arrest.[FN59] Prosecution could also 
become a statewide function with uniform policies for prosecution set at 
a central state office: priorities, going rates for plea bargains, etc.[FN60] 
Both of these moves would map onto other areas of statewide 
centralization, most notably courts, which initially emerged at the local 
and municipal level, with “funding and rulemaking authority … either 
split between state and local governments or fully assumed at the local 
level.”[FN61] 
States could also unify their corrections systems, combining author-
*1080 ity for all custodial prisoners—including, in some cases, 
probation, parole, and community corrections—into a single statewide 
agency with a single budget.[FN62] There are perhaps diminishing 
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returns to unification as state systems get larger and more 
complex,[FN63] and unified correction systems have thus far been the 
province of states with small populations: Alaska, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Hawaii, Rhode Island, Vermont, and, recently, Maine.[FN64] 
Statewide unification, though, seems much less in tune with the 
political heterogeneity of individual states, and it is correspondingly 
unclear how statewide priorities could be set, particularly in populous 
states. Currently, prosecution is overwhelmingly local, with statewide 
*1081 prosecutors generally handling only certain types of crimes such 
as public corruption and election fraud, federal benefits fraud, regulatory 
crimes and consumer protection, as well as local prosecutions involving 
a conflict of interest.[FN65] Statewide prosecution also seems at odds 
with, say, the localism embedded in the Sixth Amendment's requirement 
that juries be drawn not only from the state but also the “district wherein 
the crime shall have been committed.”[FN66] Complete unification at 
the state level would be a much more radical change; whether there is 
something inherently preferable about state administration will be 
discussed in the following  
 
III. Criticisms of Fiscal Decentralization 
 
This Part discusses four objections to the policies proposed: 
distribution of resources, disparate treatment, dumping crime and 
criminals, and issues of scale. The scale of certain subpopulations in the 
prison system, particularly the number of mentally ill people behind bars, 
is perhaps the best reason to keep the state involved. Local facilities 
might not be able to adequately house and treat the mentally ill in the 
way a statewide facility could. But allowing for some statewide 
provision of facilities does not mean the state would have to subsidize 
them. Indeed, a stateless system would allow counties to decide whether 
criminally punishing or civilly treating the mentally ill made the most 
sense without the distorting influence of prison subsidies. 
As for the other objections, a lack of centralized prison provision 
does not necessarily entail a lack of standards. States built their prisons 
in order to promote treatment, but there is nothing logically or 
historically necessary about state provision of or payment for local 
imprisonment needs.[FN67] Inequality is, arguably, more likely in a 
system such as ours where costs and decision-making authority have 
been decoupled, because it is so much harder to figure out the source of 
the problem and who is to blame for it. Local variations can currently be 
hidden in statewide statistics, which equalize local variations across the 
state population. 
Criminal Law Bulletin 12/15/2014 1:39 PM 
 
 
The present system is also equally vulnerable to charges that it fails 
*1082 to promote equality: our system does not explicitly pursue or 
deliver resource equality, provides few means of reducing disparate 
treatment, and encourages the dumping of costs. Decentralization could, 
however, provide better opportunities to address these problems. The 
state could address the root causes of inequality, not simply try to address 
inequality via prison subsidies. A more transparent system that more 
clearly isolated local variations might actually shed greater light on 
disparate treatment and could potentially generate popular support to 
deal with the problem politically. States could ensure that counties don't 
simply dump their crime problems on other counties by implementing 
mandatory periods where offenders had to remain inside a county's 
borders. The change in the political economy of local punishment might 
even promote more equality and consistency, as Lisa Miller, Stuart 
Scheingold, and William Stuntz have argued. In sum, a decentralized 
state does not create problems so much as reveal extant problems; this 
revelation might provide a more effective means of addressing these 
problems. 
A. Distributional Concerns 
As noted earlier, however, current prison funding is typically not tied 
to factors such as poverty level, educational attainment, or other forms 
of social deficits. The same is true of criminal justice funding more 
generally. The correctional free lunch of the present system does very 
little to guarantee minimum levels of quality or quantity across localities 
even as it exposes the state to virtually unlimited financial liability. It 
does nothing to address issues about lawyering and investigation, and if 
the free lunch leads to overcrowding, it can degrade the prison 
experience for all inmates.[FN68] At best, assuming that poverty causes 
crime and crime causes imprisonment, both of which are far from certain, 
the correctional free lunch might indirectly redistribute money—by 
subsidizing prison beds for inmates from poor (hence) crime-ridden 
counties—but the empirical evidence for such a claim is scant. The areas 
that use a lot of prison resources are not necessarily the most crime 
ridden, and poverty itself is not necessarily the driving force behind 
violent crime.[FN69] 
If redistributing resources on the basis of need were a goal, however, 
state governments could always tie funding to income levels, or to other 
demographic factors that it thought were relevant. Perhaps a guarantee 
of minimum funding (either aggregate or per capita) could ensure that 
localities met certain minimum standards. Guaranteeing a minimum 
level, however, is certainly possible without writing a blank check to 
fund all prison commitments.*1083 
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The two proposals, then, are not more regressive than the current 
system—they simply lay bare the fact that redistribution on the basis of 
income or resources is not the current default in criminal justice funding. 
Again, this is a virtue of decentralization—greater would make these 
problems easier to diagnose. 
B. Disparate Treatment 
A related objection to the resource concern is fear that localism 
would enshrine disparate treatment of local populations, raising equal 
protection concerns. Equal protection is, undoubtedly, a primary concern 
in criminal law, but the dominant problem is the debilitated status of the 
jurisprudence itself: there is, practically, no equal protection doctrine in 
criminal justice.[FN70] Localities currently investigate, prosecute, and 
sentence crimes differently, and it is almost impossible, without a 
smoking gun document, to raise an Equal Protection claim.[FN71] Such 
a document would itself be practically impossible to discover after 
United States v. Armstrong, which requires a threshold showing that the 
government declined to prosecute “similarly situated suspects of other 
races” before discovery can be granted.[FN72] It seems unlikely that the 
existence of prison subsidies alone serves to deter lawlessness by local 
law enforcement in ways that, say, liability for civil rights violations 
under § 1983 does not. 
Even where there are local equal protection violations or other 
constitutional issues, however, a subdivided state might more readily 
reveal them. We know that issues of race, for example, creep into *1084 
every part of the criminal justice system, from racial profiling during 
investigation to disparate sentences for powder and crack cocaine. There 
is no reason, however, to assume that any bias (conscious or 
unconscious) operates uniformly throughout a state. Local variation in 
disparate treatment will necessarily rise above and fall below the average 
of a state's disparate treatment as a whole. Centralization allows a state 
to more easily hide its inequalities by averaging across intra-state 
differences. No less an expert than David Baldus himself observed that 
“anti-black discrimination in some counties may be neutralized by pro-
black or no discrimination in other counties with a cancelling out of any 
statewide effect.”[FN73] If we were to stop focusing on the state level 
and focus instead on localities, evidence of disparate treatment might 
more readily reveal itself. We might discover that liberal urban areas are, 
in fact, padding the state average, and that some areas have long violated 
equal protection. (We might also discover that the opposite is true.) But 
disaggregation would heighten actual, extant distinctions among 
localities. It would make any political discussion at the statewide level 
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better informed. Everyone could see which counties are doing better and 
which ones worse. 
Of course, the state could also assume responsibility for oversight—
or enforce minimum standards—even if it did not pay for or operate 
prisons. After all, a state government need not wait to fix a problem until 
a court tells it to. The state could set statewide standards, investigate 
counties, publish data on outcomes, list under- and over-performing 
districts, disseminate best practices, and diagnose problems. Statewide 
regulation and enforcement could be kept even if administration and 
subsidies were discarded. 
But, ultimately, statewide centralization of any kind might do more 
to perpetuate unequal treatment than localization, as Lisa Miller,[FN74] 
Stuart Scheingold,[FN75] and William Stuntz[FN76] have argued. At 
the local level, the politics of crime are more holistic, more democratic, 
and provide fewer barriers to participation for the poor and/or people of 
color.[FN77] The structure of state politics lends itself to punitive 
policies; local politics *1085 is more redistributive.[FN78] Part of the 
reason for this is the emphasis on symbolic politics, itself a product of 
how far removed statewide political bodies are from actual day-to-day 
concerns.[FN79] Localities are different, and policies should reflect that: 
“In a heterogeneous society marked by disparities of wealth, opportunity, 
and influence, as well as by great cultural variation, to treat all 
individuals alike will compound rather than mitigate injustice.”[FN80] 
In fact, Stuntz maintains that “centralized democratic power seems 
associated with discrimination and severity. In the past, local democratic 
control of criminal justice appears to have produced equality and 
lenity.”[FN81] Local justice can mediate the competing demands of 
fighting both crime and mass incarceration because local residents suffer 
from both.[FN82] 
Ultimately, a state with a regionalized criminal justice system might 
provide more protections against Equal Protection violations than a 
statewide one. No judicial tools would be lost: jails are subjected to the 
same judicial oversight that state prisons are, so any problems could be 
fixed using the same means. Federal and state agencies can *1086 still 
take rogue localities to heel via regulations, statues, and suits.[FN83] 
And political will might be easier to generate if only parts of the state 
were responsible for the constitutional violations: citizens might be more 
ready to blame or sanction particular locales as a means of distancing 
themselves from distasteful practices. 
C. Dumping Crime and Criminals 
While it is true that local governments stay put, crime and criminals 
do not. Perhaps decentralization will give counties more incentives to 
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dump crime and criminals on other jurisdictions, encouraging their 
criminals to move to other jurisdictions in order to save local time and 
resources. Crime-riddled counties who choose fiscal conservatism over 
law and order might “infect” other counties, as criminal networks grow 
or are left untreated. Under a centralized prison system nothing stops the 
exportation of crime and criminals, however, and they can and do move 
now.[FN84] As more costs need to be accounted for by counties, though, 
budgets might become—or at least seem—tighter, and there might be 
greater incentives for localities to try to decrease costs by actively 
shedding crime and criminals. 
A decentralized state could enhance local accountability by requiring 
offenders to stay within county borders for a given period of time. That 
is, counties would thus have to keep offenders for a given post-release 
term in order to avoid dumping of criminals, just as they pay for any of 
the costs associated with criminal justice policies. Such a “pay and stay” 
policy would mean that counties would have to live with the results of 
counter-productive policies. If an offender has been inadequately 
rehabilitated, then the county that failed to rehabilitate him would bear 
the consequences of his or her subsequent criminality. 
The idea of returning offenders to a given county for a period of years 
following release is quite common in states today, so this suggestion is 
less of a change than an explanation of how current policy already deals 
with crime-dumping concerns. When combined with fis- *1087 cal 
responsibility, pay and stay would ensure that the outcomes of the 
choices about offender interventions—whether incarceration, treatment, 
or some combination—were borne by the communities that implemented 
them, ensuring that incentives were properly aligned. 
D. Scale and Complexity 
County lines are not drawn on the basis of population. Even though 
counties are currently responsible for incarceration in jails, counties 
might be unable to house “state” prison populations if the counties are 
too small or their prisoner populations too large. Counties might find 
themselves overwhelmed by the regulatory functions they would be 
taking on—tracking data and auditing it would be difficult for sparsely-
populated counties with little capacity, as well as for densely-populated 
areas with perhaps too much complexity in their data. Jails also have 
populations that churn more rapidly than prisons, owing to generally 
shorter sentences and a significant part of the population that is simply 
being held until bail can be posted or a plea deal can be made. A one-
size-fits-all approach to counties might thus be too large in some cases 
and too small in others. Indeed, prosecutors' offices have already 
experimented with “community” or “zone” prosecution within large 
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urban counties. Zone prosecution divides these counties into smaller sub-
areas and assigns teams of attorneys to them; they are responsible for all 
cases arising out of their particular part of the jurisdiction.[FN85] 
There might also be economies of scale to centralization for 
subpopulations of prisoners with special programming or security needs. 
These prisoners might require particular facilities or staff not needed by 
the general population, and it might therefore make more sense to spread 
these costs—and open up their utilization—across a larger tax base. 
These needs provide the strongest arguments for state institutions. 
However, there is nothing about these needs that requires state 
governments to pay for all prisoners, or that requires them to do so 
without putting counties to the test. The state could always require that 
inmates identified with special needs—risk, education level, etc.—be 
proven to require special treatment before the state provides it for 
them.[FN86] On the other hand, if the state failed to provide subsidies 
for certain populations—say, the mentally ill—coun- *1088 ties might 
have much clearer incentives to divert these populations away from the 
criminal justice system and towards treatment unless incarceration were 
absolutely necessary, particularly since coverage of mental health has 
increased under both the Affordable Care Act and the Mental Health 
Parity and Addiction Equity Act.[FN87] 
There is also an important distinction between physical control and 
financial, regulatory, and programmatic control. A single physical 
facility could have a number of virtual prisons inside it, where counties 
could pick and choose which functions they would perform with others 
and which they would administer—or at least pay for and regulate—
themselves. A state agency might continue to provide prison beds but 
move towards a capitation system similar to that used in the downsizing 
of juvenile prisons, whereby counties would pay for each prisoner 
housed in a centralized facility. This could be combined, say, with a risk-
based capitation fee, whereby sentencing jurisdictions would be required 
to pay larger amounts for less-dangerous offenders.[FN88] In this way, 
localities would be incentivized to send only the most dangerous 
prisoners—those with gang affiliations and discipline problems, for 
example—or the neediest prisoners to specialized facilities. Counties 
would still be responsible for prisoners, whether physically or 
financially, however, even if the state chose to house them or subsidize 
their housing. But the point here is that the case for state involvement 
would have to be made—not simply assumed. 
Counties might not, more generally, be able to afford to build local 
prisons large enough to accommodate the large populations currently in 
state prisons. This raises the question of whether the scale of mass 
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incarceration is, in fact, due to the ability of state prisons to accommodate 
these populations. Perhaps we have built ourselves into the problem, not 
in response to it. It would be much harder for counties to overbuild within 
their boundaries and within their budgets. Though the accounting would 
not change, and though the state should be unable to do what counties in 
the aggregate cannot do, the ultimate costs would be more difficult to 
hide within a smaller, less complex budget, *1089 where the linkage 
between cause and effect—and the effects of budget shortfalls 
themselves—were more locally evident. 
County lines are certainly not the only way to subdivide a state, of 
course.[FN89] Counties might not map onto crime and/or population 
patterns accurately.[FN90] Some states might want to organize on 
regional levels, or metropolitan statistical areas. Counties are a good 
place to start, though, because counties are the dominant model for 
subdividing states, and existing political authority—and law 
enforcement and judicial authority—typically follows county borders. 
Counties could also send prisoners to other counties' facilities with 
excess capacity—a practice that is more than a hundred years old.[FN91] 
Counties with larger facilities could thus put them to use by leasing space 
to other counties.[FN92] 
The last argument concerns the physical location of facilities. As 
stated earlier, one could imagine that the physical location of prisons and 
jails would not change, and that jurisdiction would be virtual, with a 
single physical facility housing prisoners subject to different counties' 
financial, regulatory, and programmatic control. But there might also be 
an argument for requiring a county to house its prisoners within its 
boundaries. Prisoner reentry is made more difficult the further a prisoner 
gets from his or her home community. Siting prisons “in county” would 
have important expressive value as well. Prisoners are a county's 
responsibility. It should be a fact of life that offenders do not just go 
“away.” They are still part of the community, even as they are being 
punished by it. Incarceration would thus take its rightful place as part of 
the body politic, not something to be outsourced from it. The harms of 
having a prison within the county are part of the cost of incarceration—




This Article has proposed a new approach to the issue of local 
discretion in criminal justice. Taking as a given that discretion cannot be 
eliminated, and that localities use their discretion to set criminal justice 
policies, it has proposed fiscal limits as a means of balancing local 
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preferences and statewide policies. Fiscal limits remove the correctional 
free lunch and address this systemic problem with an appropriately 
systemic solution. This avoids the “real offense” problem so fatal to 
solutions which depend on sorting through the results of individual cases. 
This Article has also largely not explored several ways in which 
prison populations might be managed. I have taken as a given that state 
legislatures are unlikely to reduce the size and scope of their penal codes, 
and have, instead, discussed the ways in which these extensive codes 
exacerbate the local discretion problem.[FN93] I have also taken as a 
given that prisons are difficult to regulate and reform, and that any 
attempts to regulate and reform them will be expensive. I have further 
assumed that local elections for key criminal justice players (district 
attorneys, sheriffs, and the local officials who hire police) are unlikely to 
be replaced by statewide elections or appointments. In short, one might 
wish that the system we have were different: that it penalized less, that it 
rehabilitated more, and that the politics of crime led to a smaller number 
of crimes punished by shorter and less severe penalties. But while we are 
at it, we might as well wish that ice cream were a vegetable. The point 
of this Article is to ask whether, given the remoteness of other kinds of 
well-trodden policy proposals, we might change the system by changing 
who pays for it. 
Rationing access to incarceration might be a way of reducing 
imprisonment. But rather than try to impose a uniformity on states, this 
Article has explored what would happen if we acknowledged the degree 
of local control in the present system and stopped subsidizing only some 
of these decisions. This would not necessarily mean that the state was 
entirely absent from criminal justice, just that it would use different 
means to set incentives, ones that are more narrowly and purposively 
tailored than the correctional free lunch. Ultimately, ending prison 
subsidies could ensure that local decisions reflected sincere local 
preferences via the mechanisms of greater transparency and 
accountability. The move towards decentralization would acknowledge 
the reality that states are heterogeneous polities with real local 
differences. The present system does almost nothing to minimize these 
differences. It merely makes them harder to see. 
[FN*] Assistant Professor, Santa Clara School of Law. My sincere 
thanks go to those who read and commented on earlier versions of the 
article, including those who participated in the University of Michigan 
Law School's Prison Scholarship Roundtable, participants in the Santa 
Clara Faculty Enrichment Workshop, and Farah Brelvi, David Friedman, 
Kelly Mitchell, Alexandra Natapoff, Michelle Oberman, David Sloss, 
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and Robert Weisberg. All errors remain mine. 
-  
 
[FN1] The most recent number from the Bureau of Justice Statistics 
is 1,382,418, relying on state reports. E. Ann Carson and William J. 
Sabol, Prisoners in 2011, at 3 (2012), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p11.pdf. 
-  
[FN2] I arrived at this figure by multiplying the number of 
prisoners by an estimated cost of $29,000 per prisoner. This estimate 
comes from the Pew Center on the States, One in 31: the Long Reach 




[FN3] Carson & Sabol, supra note 1, at 3. 
-  
[FN4] There were 711,643 people in state prisons in 1991. Allen 
Beck et al., Survey of State Prison Inmates, 1991, at 3 (1993), available 
at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/SOSPI91.PDF. Dividing the 
population figures in note 1 by this number yields a ratio of 1.94. 
-  
[FN5] There were 177,113 people in state prisons in 1971. Patrick 
A. Langan et al., Historical Statistics on Prisoners in State and Federal 
Institutions, Yearend 1925-86 at 11 (1988), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/digitization/111098ncjrs.pdf. Dividing 
the population figures in note 1 by this number yields a ratio of 7.81. 
-  
[FN6] This problem is exacerbated by the expansive nature of state 
penal codes, which serves to delegate discretionary exercises of power 
to local officials. I discuss this further in Part I. For the definitive 
theoretical treatment of why legislatures write expansive penal codes, 
see William Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 
Mich. L. Rev. 505 (2001–2002). For the ways in which law “on the 
books” differs from “law on the ground,” see Mona Lynch, Mass 
Incarceration, Legal Change, and Locale, 10 Criminology & Pub. Pol. 
673, 681 (2011). 
-  
[FN7] W. David Ball, Tough on Crime (on the State's Dime): How 
Violent Crime Does Not Drive California Counties' Incarceration 
Rates—and Why It Should, 28 Ga. St. L. Rev. 987, 1014 (2012). 
-  
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[FN8] For a fuller treatment of these observations, see W. David 
Ball, Why State Prisons? (forthcoming Yale L. & Pol'y Rev.), available 
at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1871274. 
-  
[FN9] See, e.g., Stuart A. Scheingold, The Politics of Law and 
Order 74 (2010). 
-  
[FN10] Franklin E. Zimring and Gordon Hawkins, The Scale of 
Imprisonment 140 (1991). 
-  
[FN11] See, e.g., One in 31, supra note 2, at 2 (estimating that the 
daily cost of prison is twenty times that of the daily cost of probation). 
-  
[FN12] For ease of expression, this Article uses the term “county” 
as a short-hand reference to local administrative units that constitute the 
locus of decision-making on criminal justice issues, including parishes, 
districts, and the like. For the viewpoint that the county can, in some 
ways, distort local criminal justice, particularly when used as the basis 
for the Sixth Amendment's vicinage requirement, see William Stuntz, 
Unequal Justice, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1969, 2035 (2008) (arguing that 
“[i]f the goal is to protect the interests of residents of high-crime city 
neighborhoods, that [the county] is the wrong pool”). 
-  
[FN13] In Quitman County Mississippi, for example, local officials 
raised taxes and shortened the school year in order to cover the costs 
associated with a capital trial. Poor County Forced to Finance Killers' 
Appeals, L.A. Times, Mar. 28, 1999, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/1999/mar/28/news/mn-21958. In a separate 
article, I have argued that this choice was more likely to have been a 
sincere reflection of local values and social utility than a decision to 
seek the death penalty where the costs were covered by the state. See 
Ball, supra note 8. 
-  
[FN14] Usage is, of course, relative, and saying that a county uses a 
“high” rate of prison necessarily involves judgments about what a 
“normal” usage of prison is. I have dealt with this issue in a prior 
article, where I defined “high use” counties as those which were in the 
top quartile of state prison-to-crime ratios more than seven of ten years. 
Ball, supra note 7, at 1014. 
-  
[FN15] I note just a few recent examples here. The idea of 
performance based incentives for prosecutors has been bandied about 
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but not fully developed. See, e.g., Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, 
Contingent Rewards for Prosecutors?, ABA Crim. Just. 55, 56 (Fall 
2011) (reviewing the policy idea that prosecutors be paid bonuses on a 
contingent basis but finding “no ethics opinions or cases that have 
considered bonuses or prizes for conviction rates at trial”). 
- See also James M. Doyle, Why (and How) We Need to Improve 
America's Prosecution System, available at 
http://www.thecrimereport.org/viewpoints/2012-05-why-and-how-we-
need-to-improve-americas-prosecution. Doyle proposes a division of 
prosecution into two offices: one which sets a price for plea (which he 
calls solicitors) and the other a more traditional prosecutor's office. 
Solicitors would set the price that the crime was worth, what he calls 
“sentencing investments.” Prosecutors would take the rest of the cases 
that did not bargain out. The idea is that this would internalize the costs 
of trial. 
- Ronald F. Wright and Marc L. Miller propose internal bureaucratic 
checks on individual prosecutors within agencies. Ronald F. Wright & 
Marc L. Miller, the Worldwide Accountability Deficit for Prosecutors, 
67 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1587, 1603 (2010). But, of course, this only 
ensures that the individual prosecutor is in line with the agency as a 
whole—not that the agency's preferences are aligned with society's 
preferences, which is, ultimately, what's important. I note also that their 
prediction that “data will slowly drive out local variation among 
prosecutor offices and individual variation within offices,” id. at 1617, 
must first account for how this data will be defined, isolating real 
offense factors so that apples are compared with apples. 
-  
[FN16] Stuntz argues that the problem is actually that discretion is 
concentrated only in the hands of the prosecution: “when prosecutors 
have enormous discretionary power, giving other decisionmakers 
discretion promotes consistency, not arbitrariness. Discretion limits 
discretion; institutional competition curbs excess and abuse.” Stuntz, 
supra note 12, at 2039. 
-  
[FN17] At a minimum, we would need to be able to distinguish 
among non-discretionary results (e.g., mandatory minimums, where 
there was no discretion), discretionary but “normal” results (genuinely 
close cases that turned out “well”), discretionary but unacceptable or 
unreasonable results (a sensible decision resulting in a bad outcome), 
and unreasonably discretionary, unreasonable results (a biased decision 
resulting in a bad outcome). 
-  
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[FN18] One possible exception is driving while intoxicated (DWI). 
There one could conceivably determine that the real offense is the 
offender's blood alcohol content (BAC), which is chemically 
quantifiable. These data are not always available, however. See, e.g., 
Christopher L. Griffin, Frank A. Sloan, and Lindsey M. Eldred, 
Corrections for Racial Disparities in Law Enforcement, 55 William & 
Mary L. Rev. (forthcoming 2014), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2104182 (analyzing DWI dispositions by race, 
but not controlling for the actual BAC because the data was not 
available). 
-  
[FN19] Of course, even these figures might fail to capture all of the 
phenomena in a given system, and could be manipulated, but there are 
political reasons not to game these figures, as I discuss infra. 
-  
[FN20] See, e.g., William Crawford, the English prison reformer, 
writing in his Report on the Penitentiaries of the United States 5 (1835, 
1969 Patterson Smith ed.). “Experience shows how difficult it is to 
preserve an [sic] uniform course of punishment wherever the legislature 
has afforded any latitude for discretion, although this discretion be 
exercised by men of similar education, habits, studies, and 
employments.” See also G. de Beaumont & A. de Tocqueville, On the 
Penitentiary System in the United States, and Its Application in France 
65–66 (Francis Lieber trans., 1833). (“How shall the number of crimes 
be proved? By that of the convictions? Several causes, however, may 
produce more frequent convictions, though the number of crimes be the 
same.”). 
-  
[FN21] Blockburger v. U.S., 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76 
L. Ed. 306 (1932) (holding that one sale of narcotics could nevertheless 
be subject to charges under two criminal statutes, provided that each 
statute “requires proof of a different element.”). 
-  
[FN22] Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 300–01. 
-  
[FN23] Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 301. 
-  
[FN24] Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 301. 
-  
[FN25] Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304 (internal citations omitted). 
-  
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[FN26] See, e.g., William Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of 
Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505, 519 (2001–2002) (“[C]riminal 
codes consist of a great many more sets of overlapping concentric 
circles than concentric circles. Which is to say that defendants who 
commit what is, in ordinary terminology, a single crime can be treated 
as though they committed many different crimes—and that state of 
affairs is not the exception, but the rule.”). 
-  
[FN27] Stuntz, supra note 26, at 506. 
-  
[FN28] John F. Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison 
Growth, 28 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 1239, 1241 (2012). 
-  
[FN29] Stuntz, supra note 26, at 509 (“As criminal law expands law 
enforcers, not the law, determine who goes to prison and for how long. 
The end point of this progression is clear: criminal codes that cover 
everything and decide nothing, that serve only to delegate power to 
district attorneys' offices and police departments.”). 
-  
[FN30] Kyle Graham, Crimes, Widgets, and Plea Bargaining: An 
Analysis of Charge Content, Pleas, and Trials, 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1573 
(2012). See also Kyle Graham, Facilitating Crimes, 15 Lewis & Clark 
L. Rev. 665 (2011) (discussing, inter alia, pleas to a “broken 
speedometer” moving violation: these violations would be impossible 
for law enforcement to detect but are, instead, landing places for 
negotiations that start with other, more serious charges, such as 
speeding). 
-  
[FN31] See, e.g., John Tierney, For Lesser Crimes, Rethinking Life 
Behind Bars, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 2012, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/12/science/mandatory-prison-
sentences-face-growing-skepticism.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
(describing case in which woman was sentenced to life without parole 
after police found cocaine in a lockbox in her house, while her 
husband, who led the cocaine dealing and had “a much longer criminal 
record” was sentenced to less than years in prison, due to his ability to 
provide evidence to the prosecution). 
-  
[FN32] Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 
2d 1081, 86 Ohio L. Abs. 513, 84 A.L.R.2d 933 (1961) (holding that 
“all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the 
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Constitution is … inadmissible in a state court”). 
-  
[FN33] See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S. Ct. 
1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966) (holding that “the 
prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or 
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant 
unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to 
secure the privilege against self-incrimination”). 
-  
[FN34] See, e.g., Tanner v. U.S., 483 U.S. 107, 107 S. Ct. 2739, 97 
L. Ed. 2d 90, 22 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1143 (1987) (refusing to overturn a 
guilty verdict despite testimony that jurors drank and used drugs during 
the trial). 
-  
[FN35] For a discussion of the difficulties of coding charges and 
real offenses, see M. Marit Rehavi & Sonia B. Starr, Racial Disparity in 
Federal Criminal Charging and Its Sentencing Consequences (May 7, 
2012). Univ. Mich. L. & Econ, Empirical Legal Studies Center Paper 
No. 12-002, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1985377 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1985377. The authors of the study note 
that their analysis of racial bias in charging can only measure the 
change between arrest offense and charge offense, but it cannot “rule 
out the possibility that such disparities are legally justified by variations 
in the evidence.” Id. at 14. See also Scheingold, supra note 9, at 160–61 
(discussing the difficulty of finding variables that explain variance, 
even though “informal and reasonably equitable norms exist”). 
-  
[FN36] See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 16, 123 S. Ct. 
1179, 155 L. Ed. 2d 108 (2003). 
-  
[FN37] Megan Berwick et al., Wobblers & Criminal Justice in 





[FN38] See, e.g., Berwick et al., supra note 37, at ix (noting that 
actual data about the quantity of drugs in an individual's possession is 
not tracked). 
-  
[FN39] But, of course, there are limits to what one can do to redress 
grievances against prosecutors. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 
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409, 96 S. Ct. 984, 47 L. Ed. 2d 128 (1976) (holding that prosecutors 
are immune from suit under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983). 
-  
[FN40] This is, in some ways, reminiscent of the Court's conclusion 
in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 95 L. Ed. 2d 
262 (1987) (holding that evidence of systemic bias in the 
administration of the death penalty (the Baldus study) was insufficient 
to prove that bias drove the death sentence in defendant's case). This 
analysis starts where McCleskey's stops. If the problem is systemic, 
then the solutions must be as well. 
-  
[FN41] I discuss my analysis of the California experience from 
2000–09 in my recent article Tough on Crime (on the State's Dime): 
How Violent Crime Does Not Drive California Counties' Incarceration 
Rates—and Why It Should, supra note 7 (concluding that counties used 
prison at wildly different rates during that time, and that the bulk of this 
difference could not be explained by referring to differences in rates of 
violent crime). 
-  
[FN42] Ball, supra note 8. 
-  
[FN43] I define criminal justice need in terms of violent crime, and 
discuss my reasons for doing so infra at Part A. 
-  
[FN44] A state might even want to distribute resources more 
finely—say, by giving more money to those neighborhoods reporting 
the most homicides. I discuss the issue in greater detail, with particular 
emphasis on the ideas of Lisa Miller, William Stuntz, and Stuart 
Scheingold in section III.B, infra. 
-  
[FN45] There might also need to be necessary adjustments 
involving the costs of imprisonment for those offenders currently 
serving sentences. That is, because the total cost of prisons each year is 
not just for new admissions, but also includes the costs of those already 
sentenced, some counties will continue to be subsidized for those 
prisoners they sent under a correctional free lunch regime. A state 
might decide to cover these costs during the transition or to make 
counties repay it for past use. Such a decision would undoubtedly 
involve political calculations. For the purposes of this Article, policies 
that concern past decisions would have little effect on the forward-
looking incentives the end of state subsidies would create. 
-  
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[FN46] A series of reports from New York City, the municipality 
which is best known for rolling out data-driven crime control 
(“Compstat”) has recently alleged that there is pressure to downgrade 
serious crimes in order to promote a narrative that crime is on the 
decline. See, e.g., John A. Eterno, Policing by the Numbers, N.Y. 
Times, June 18, 2012, at 23A (“Most seriously, crimes are being 
downgraded; crime scenes are revisited, and victims called back, 
expressly so that reports can be revised, and the seriousness of the 
crime downplayed. It should be no surprise that police manipulation of 
crime data has been reported in other jurisdictions—Baltimore, New 
Orleans, even Paris—where the police have emulated New York's 
tactics.”). Eterno is a co-author, with Eli B. Silverman, of The Crime 
Numbers Game: Management by Manipulation (2012), a study of data 
manipulation in the New York Police Department. See also Graham 
Rayman, The NYPD Tapes Confirmed, Village Voice, Mar. 7, 2012, 
available at http://www.villagevoice.com/2012-03-07/news/the-nypd-
tapes-confirmed/ (quoting an unreleased NYPD internal investigative 
report which concludes: “When viewed in their totality, a disturbing 
pattern is prevalent and gives credence to the allegation that crimes are 
being improperly reported in order to avoid index-crime classifications 
…. This trend is indicative of a concerted effort to deliberately 
underreport crime in the 81st Precinct.”). 
-  
[FN47] While parts of this proposal are no doubt similar to 
California's current program of realignment—which limits prisoners 
eligible for commitment to state prisons to those convicted of violent, 
serious, or sex offenses—it differs by letting the money flow both 
ways. Under realignment, the state does not reallocate all of the money 
it saves from prisoners, nor can localities tell the state that they want 
the money the state would have spent on prison. Prison is still “free” to 
counties, and not treated as a fungible pot of money: the state has 
simply restricted prison access to a certain offense level. 
-  
[FN48] Unified corrections systems combine authority for all 
custodial prisoners—including, in some cases, probation, parole, and 
community corrections—into a single agency with a single budget. See, 
e.g., Barbara Krauth, A Review of the Jail Function Within State 
Unified Corrections Systems (National Institute of Corrections, 1997), 
available at http://nicic.gov/Library/014024. 
-  
[FN49] Hawaii's unified corrections system contains both 
corrections and law enforcement, though it excludes prosecutors. 
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Krauth, supra note 48, at 3. 
-  
[FN50] For a summary of some of these problems in the California 
context, see W. David Ball & Robert Weisberg, Justice Information 
Sharing: A Legal Primer for Criminal Justice Practitioners in California 
(Dec. 4, 2010), Stanford Public Law Working Paper No. 2141523, 
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2141523 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2141523. 
-  
[FN51] W. David Ball, E Pluribus Unum: Data and Operations 
Integration in the California Criminal Justice System, 21 Stan. L. & 
Pol'y Rev. 277 (2010). 
-  
[FN52] Changes in law enforcement—the “inputs” to the criminal 
justice system—have obvious resource implications on other parts of 
the system. If police arrest more people, ore prosecutors charge more 
people, then, ceteris paribus, more court time, more jail and prison 
beds, and more community supervision will be used. Similarly, changes 
in the execution of sentences—whether custodial or non-custodial—
will have resource implications on law enforcement. If prisons do not 
treat drug addiction, for example, law enforcement can count on 
increases in the amount of time they will have to dedicate to crimes 
fueled by drug abuse when prisoners are released. 
-  
[FN53] Indeed, William Stuntz has argued that “[p]olice officers 
and prison cells are substitutes: alternative means by which 
governments spend money to battle crime.” Stuntz, supra note 12, at 
2015. 
-  
[FN54] For a more detailed discussion of the possible externalities 
to local jail reentry programming, for example, see John Roman & 
Aaron Chalfin, Does it Pay to Invest in Reentry Programs for Jail 
Inmates?, Justice Policy Center 1 (2006), available at: 
http://www.urban.org/reentryroundtable/roman_chalfin.pdf (outlining a 
blueprint for cost-benefit analysis of jail reentry and concluding that 
“under a variety of conditions, jail-based reentry programs would have 
to reduce recidivism by less than two percent to offset the cost of jail-
based programming,” but that these benefits would accrue to the public, 
not necessarily to local jail budgets. “[W]e estimate that approximately 
70% of the benefits of abated crime accrue to community members 
while the remaining 30% accrues to the criminal justice system.”). 
-  
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[FN55] Adam M. Gershowitz, An Informational Approach to the 
Mass Imprisonment Problem, 40 Ariz. St. L. J. 47, 50 (2008). 
-  
[FN56] Gershowitz, supra note 55, at 50–51. 
-  
[FN57] Michael A. Wolff, Missouri Provides Cost of Sentences and 
Recidivism Data: What Does Cost Have to Do with Justice?, 24 Fed. 
Sent. Rptr. 161 (Feb. 2012). Vermont is considering a similar policy. 
See Peter Hirschfeld, Sentencing in Vt.: Factor in Cost?, Jan. 23, 2013, 
available at 
http://www.timesargus.com/article/20130123/NEWS03/701239955. 
For a more critical view of Missouri's practice of making sentencing 
costs known to judges, see Chad Flanders, Cost as a Sentencing Factor: 
A Theoretical Inquiry, 77 Mo. L. Rev. 391, 395 (2012) (While agreeing 
that sentencing cost should have some weight, not none at all, noting 
that “[t]here is … a strong argument against making cost an especially 
salient factor, which is what the Missouri Sentencing Commission 
reform unambiguously does.”) (emphasis in original). 
-  
[FN58] I note, however, that the implementation of new policies 
would take place in an organizational culture that might prove resistant. 
For general observations about the importance of organizational culture 
in law enforcement, see, e.g., Scheingold, supra note 35, at 80–81, 107. 
-  
[FN59] Looking outside the United States, other countries employ 
the FBI model, with “national or provincial [police] bureaucracies 
designed to keep politics at bay ….” William J. Stuntz, Accountable 
Policing, Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 130, at 2 (Feb. 21, 
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=886170 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.886170. 
-  
[FN60] In the capital punishment context, Professor Adam 
Gershowitz's observations about the uneven use of the death penalty at 
the county level has led to his endorsement of “cutting counties out of 
the death penalty system” altogether, leaving “[a]ll aspects of death 
penalty cases—charging, trial, appeal, and everything in between” in 
the hands of state-level “prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges 
whose sole responsibility is to deal with capital cases.” Adam M. 
Gershowitz, Statewide Capital Punishment: The Case for Eliminating 
Counties' Role in the Death Penalty, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 307, 310 (2010). 
But the dominant model of prosecution in the United States is local, 
“with little centralized supervision by a state-level actor.” Rachel 
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Barkow, Federalism and Criminal Law: What the Feds can Learn from 
the States, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 519, 545 (2011). 
-  
[FN61] Lynn Langton & Thomas H. Cohen, State Court 
Organization, 1987–2004, at 1 (Oct. 2007), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/sco8704.pdf. Court reform 
made courts into more of a state function, borne out of a desire to 
promote professionalism, and to administer the system in a more 
efficient and cost-effective way. Id. Only ten court systems (as of 2004) 
were unified, but even this figure relies on self-designation: “No state 
court system actually meets all of the criteria for total unification.” Id. 
at 6. This might be due to the existence of special jurisdiction courts 
(e.g., mental health courts, family courts, etc.). 
-  
[FN62] Barbara Krauth, A Review of the Jail Function Within State 
Unified Corrections Systems (National Institute of Corrections, 1997), 
available at http://nicic.gov/Library/014024. 
-  
[FN63] The California Prison Healthcare system is under the 
administration of a court-appointed receiver. But even this insider—on 
leave from his regular position as a law professor—suggested that the 
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation be broken up 
into smaller units, spinning off health care and other services. The 
reason had to do with the fact that the complexity of the system was 
getting in the way of greater accountability and transparency. J. Clark 
Kelso, Time to Split Up Corrections Department, Sacramento Bee, 
Dec. 20, 2010, available at 
http://prisonreformmovement.wordpress.com/category/state-
budgetmoney/page/17/ (“The department has become impossible to 
manage given the huge scope of its operations, the unrelenting 
overcrowding, and the tension between day-to-day operational 
improvement and crisis management driven by periodic bad headlines. 
It is time to reorganize CDCR into smaller organizational pieces to 
improve focus on discrete functions and to strengthen transparency and 
accountability for operations.”). 
-  
[FN64] Doug Harlow, Franklin, Somerset County Jails Reach 
Agreement with State on Cost of Inmate Sharing, Waterville Morning 
Sentinel, Aug. 2, 2012, available at 
http://www.centralmaine.com/2012/08/02/jails-reach-cost-
shareagreement_2012-08 (noting that counties are capped in the 
amount they can raise taxes to pay for correctional spending). I will 
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refrain from analyzing Maine in this Article. It appears that there are 
some growing pains, and its implementation of unified corrections is 
much more recent than any of the other states (Hawaii, the next most 
recent state, was unified in 1978/1979, almost twenty years at the time 
of the NIC publication). Barbara Krauth, A Review of the Jail Function 
Within State Unified Corrections Systems 16 (National Institute of 
Corrections, 1997), available at http://nicic.gov/Library/014024. Maine 
has had difficulty in pricing the cost of housing inmates from other 
counties. Harlow, supra (reporting on county jail's refusal to accept 
inmates from other counties until state reimbursement amount was 
increased, putting the system “on the brink of crisis”). The fiscal 
implications of its county reimbursement policies deserve much closer 
analysis that I can dedicate to them here. See An Act To Better 
Coordinate and Reduce the Cost of the Delivery of State and County 
Correctional Services, Me. P.L. 2008, ch. 653, Part A (effective Apr. 




[FN65] Rachel Barkow, Federalism and Criminal Law: What the 
Feds can Learn from the States, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 519, 545–56 (2011). 
Barkow notes, however, that there are some exceptions. Florida has a 
statewide prosecutor with authority to bring criminal charges on cases 
involving two or more intra-state jurisdictions. Id. at 565–67. 
Alabama's Attorney General has a wide-ranging power by statute to 
prosecute crimes, but, in practice, the exercise of this power is closely 
aligned with the types of crimes listed above. Id. at 567–68. Arizona 
has also established a Drug Unit to prosecute drug trafficking and 
money laundering. Id. at 568–69. 
-  
[FN66] U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
-  
[FN67] See Ball, supra note 8. 
-  
[FN68] See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 179 L. Ed. 2d 
969 (2011). 
-  
[FN69] Crime policy is not an inevitable (or mono-directional) 
response to crime itself. See, e.g., Scheingold, supra note 9, at ix-x, 48–
51. 
-  
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[FN70] William J. Stuntz, The Collapse of American Criminal 
Justice 120 (2011)(“The system as a whole may discriminate 
massively, but as no single decision-maker is responsible for more than 
a small fraction of the discrimination, the law holds no one accountable 
for it.”) 
-  
[FN71] See, e.g., Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. 
Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that the federal 
judiciary may not compel prosecution in an individual case); see also 
U. S. v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 99 S. Ct. 2198, 60 L. Ed. 2d 755 
(1979) (Congress has the power to pass statutes containing almost 
identical elements but different penalties, and the prosecution may 
freely choose between them); see also Wayte v. U.S., 470 U.S. 598, 
105 S. Ct. 1524, 84 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1985) (no malicious prosecution 
claim even though out of 674,000 violations of failing to register for the 
draft, only sixteen indictments were issued). 
-  
[FN72] 517 U.S 456, 465 (1996) (“In order to dispel the 
presumption that a prosecutor has not violated equal protection, a 
criminal defendant must present ‘clear evidence to the contrary.’ ”) 
(internal citations omitted). States have similar requirements. See, e.g., 
Delores Carr, Prosecutorial Discretion, Cal. Daily J., Nov. 26, 2007 
(discussing California's legal and ethical restraints, concluding, inter 
alia, that the executive is charged with decisions about prosecution and 
that “the prosecutor's decision about the type and number of crimes to 
charge is normally not subject to judicial review … even if the 
prosecutor's decision concerning which charges to file constricts the 
sentencing options available to the courts.”). 
-  
[FN73] David C. Baldus, Racial Discrimination in Capital and 
Non-Capital Sentencing with Special Reference to the Evidence in 
Murder and Rape Prosecutions 10 (2010), available at 
http://www.albany.edu/scj/documents/Race_Baldus.pdf. 
-  
[FN74] Lisa L. Miller, the Perils of Federalism (2008). 
-  
[FN75] Scheingold, supra note 9. 
-  
[FN76] Stuntz, supra note 12. 
-  
[FN77] Lisa L. Miller, the Perils of Federalism 11 (2008). 
-  
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[FN78] Miller, supra note 77, at 118–28, noting that participation in 
statewide politics requires resources and narrow, single-issue-focused 
campaigns, whereas local politics is both more diffuse and more 
pragmatic. 
-  
[FN79] Scheingold, supra note 9, at 58 (describing the “simple 
morality play” of good and evil necessarily abstracted from the real 
members of society who are both victims and victimizers). See also id. 
at 66–69 (noting the security of a Manichean worldview in the face of 
intractable social problems). 
-  
[FN80] Scheingold, supra note 9, at 210. Scheingold calls his vision 
of a decentralized state “neighborhood justice.” He also notes that 
standards of “uniformity and formal equality have never really been 
widely honored,” id. at 211, and that criminal justice disparities, far 
from being “irrational,” are, instead “a direct consequence of the 
political accommodations of criminal courts to their respective local 
settings ….” Id. at 226. 
-  
[FN81] Stuntz, supra note 12, at 1975. 
-  
[FN82] As Stuntz puts it, criminal justice policies can be moderated 
if we 
[p]lace more power in the hands of residents of those neighborhoods 
where the most criminals and crime victims live. Because residents of 
those neighborhoods suffer so much from crime, they are unlikely to 
support abandonment of the sort that Northern cities experienced in the 
1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s. Because those same residents suffer so 
much from mass incarceration, they are also unlikely to support the 
mindless severity of the 1980s, 1990s, and this decade. Those 
propositions fit the historical track record: when high-crime cities have 
exercised the most control over criminal justice within their borders, 
punishment levels have been more moderate and discrimination less 
pervasive than today. 
Stuntz, supra note 12, at 2031–32. Stuntz's policy suggestions are to 
provide more state and federal money to local police forces, to increase 
the number of crimes tried before neighborhood juries, and to introduce 
open-ended mens rea terms into criminal statutes to allow juries to 
exercise greater judgment. Id. 
-  
[FN83] One could even argue that local criminal justice offers more 
protection against constitutional violations, given the Supreme Court's 
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interpretation of state sovereignty. Counties are not subject to the 
sovereign immunity concerns of the Eleventh Amendment the way that 
states are. Alabama provides a notable exception to the case of local 
law enforcement—sheriffs are mentioned in the state constitution and 
have been deemed to be state actors, therefore immune to suit under 42 
U.S.C.A. § 1983. See, e.g., McMillian v. Monroe County, Ala., 520 
U.S. 781, 789, 117 S. Ct. 1734, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1997) (holding that 
Alabama sheriffs “are state officers, and that tort claims brought against 
sheriffs based on their official acts therefore constitute suits against the 
State, not suits against the sheriff's county”). 
-  
[FN84] Indeed, prisons which draw from the statewide population 
might make it easier for gangs to expand into new territories, by 
enabling them to recruit members from new geographic areas among in 
the inmate population. 
-  
[FN85] See generally Steven Jansen & Robert Hood, A Framework 
for High Performance Prosecutorial Services (Ass'n. of Prosecuting 




[FN86] This would put assessment and classification at the 
forefront of sentencing, which is, in many ways, a return to the reasons 
that justified the very establishment of state institutions in the first 
place. Ball, supra note 8, at Part II. 
-  
[FN87] See, e.g., Kirsten Beronio et al., Affordable Care Act Will 
Expand Mental Health and Substance Use Disorder Benefits and Parity 
Protections for 62 Million Americans 1 (Feb. 2013), available at 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/2013/mental/rb_mental.pdf (“The 
Affordable Care Act will provide one of the largest expansions of 
mental health and substance use disorder coverage in a generation.”). 
-  
[FN88] See, e.g., Mac Taylor, The 2012–13 Budget: Completing 
Juvenile Justice Realignment 5–6 (Feb. 15, 2012), available at 
http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis/2012/crim_justice/juvenile-justice-
021512.pdf (describing sliding scale of charges based on seriousness of 
offense, rationing of state juvenile prison on the basis of offense 
charged, and shifting of parole from the state to counties). 
-  
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[FN89] Corrections Independent Review Panel, Reforming 
Corrections (June 2004), at 5, available at 
http://www.immagic.com/eLibrary/ARCHIVES/GENERAL/CAGOV_
US/C040600D.pdf (suggesting that California adult prison operations 
be divided regionally). 
-  
[FN90] Ball, supra note 51. 
-  
[FN91] E.C. Wines & Theodore W. Dwight, Report on the Prisons 
and Reformatories of the United States and Canada, Made to the 
Legislature of New York, January, 1867, at 68 (1867). See also Jesse F. 
Steiner & Roy M. Brown, the North Carolina Chain Gang: A Study of 
County Convict Road Work 178–79 (1927, reprinted 1970 Negro 
Universities Press) (In 1927, “about half of the counties in the state 
[North Carolina] turn[ed] over their prisoners to other counties, instead 
of maintaining their own.”). 
-  
[FN92] In fact, California counties are currently experimenting with 
regional prisoner exchanges, but the costs of transportation might eat 
up the savings from not building a dedicated county facility. See 
Christina Villacorte, Sheriff's Department Considers Variety of Options 




[FN93] But see Stuntz, supra note 12, at 2032 (arguing that statutes 
which incorporated discretionary mens rea terms would result in fewer 
jury trial convictions). 
-  
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